This paper addresses the impact of sustainability in production on international trade. In particular, it examines the effect of the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) on tropical timber trade. The empirical analysis is based on a gravity equation in a difference-in-difference setting, which is estimated by a panel Heckman's selection model. This accounts for the potentially systematic selection of trading partners into timber trade activity. We then conduct a comprehensive comparative static analysis solving the structural gravity model with and without the ITTA. This allows us to determine the trade impact of an ITTA induced increase in sustainability for participating as well as for third-countries. We find that countries participating in the ITTA exhibit a significant and substantial increase in trade intensity ranging from 4% to 6%. Furthermore, we observe that this effect is more pronounced for smaller member countries. Non-ITTA countries are confronted with reduced tropical timber flows.
Introduction
In previous years, more and more countries have been signing agreements, which aim at increasing the level of sustainable natural resource management practices. They do this by unilaterally imposing stricter regulations for trade in natural resources to ban unsustainably managed products from their markets. The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) can be seen as an important example of such an effort.
1 Tropical timber producers acceding to the ITTA commit themselves to provide a higher sustainability standard in the tropical timber production. Tropical timber consumers as ITTA members reveal a higher preference for goods that comply with this standard. The increase in sustainability induced by the ITTA can be interpreted as an improvement of overall product quality 2 , which should manifest itself in the value and size of international trade flows of tropical timber. We address the following research questions in this paper. First, we ask whether the sustainability standard induced by the ITTA influences the firms' decision in the exporting country to serve a foreign market with tropical timber and whether the ITTA indeed leads to a quality improvement of the observed trade flows in addition to a reduction of trade barriers. This question is motivated by the large literature on the impact of product standards on international trade (e.g., Chen & Matoo 2008 , Czubala, Shepherd & Wilson 2009 , Disdier, Fontagné & Cadot 2015 . Second, recent studies show that product standards affect international trade differently depending on specific product characteristics (Hallak 2010 , Fajgelbaum, Grossman & Helpman 2011 , Shepherd & Wilson 2013 . In line with this, we ask how product quality, as a combination of a baseline quality component and a sustainability quality component as defined by the ITTA standard, affects patterns of international timber trade. In addition, motivated by the contributions of Murray, McCarl & Lee (2004) , Wear & Murray (2004) and Chen & Matoo (2008) , we ask how the ITTA, where only a fraction of the market participants increase their supply of and/or demand for sustainably produced tropical timber, affects the distribution of the tropical timber trade for participating and for non-participating countries.
1 Other examples of such timber agreements are a recent amendment of the US Lacey Act, 2008 (Section 8204) and the EU Timber Regulation No 995/2010, which entered into force in March 2013. They intend to reduce the amount of illegally harvested and/or unsustainably managed timber. We selected the ITTA for our analysis based on two reasons. First, the ITTA has been in force for a longer period of time than the U.S. Lacey Act 2008 and the EU Timber Regulation 2013. And second, only a small number of importing countries are taking part in the U.S. Lacey Act 2008 (United States) and the EU Timber Regulation 2013 (the 28 EU countries) which makes it difficult to take the importer countries' heterogeneity in their preferences for sustainably produced timber into account. Further, our indicator variable for the ITTA membership refers to the 1994 ITTA. However, if countries already signed the 1983 ITTA as well as the 1994 ITTA, the dummy captures not only the effect of the 1994 ITTA but the overall effect of the ITTA membership.
2 Throughout this paper we define the overall product quality of tropical timber as a combination of a baseline quality component and a second component that refers to sustainably managed tropical timber as defined by the agreement.
To answer these research questions we extend the trade model of Hallak (2010) to identify the impact of overall product quality on bilateral trade flows. We explicitly distinguish between (i) a baseline quality component as introduced by Hallak (2010) and (ii) a sustainable product quality component that refers to sustainability in the tropical timber production which is induced by the ITTA implementation itself. The sustainable product quality component involves both, supplying higher quality by guaranteeing sustainable production and the higher valuation of sustainable production by the consumers. The advantage of this approach is that we are able to decompose the ITTA induced trade effect into a supplied sustainable product standard effect and a consumers' environmental preference effect for sustainable tropical timber. This gives us a detailed view on how the introduction of a sustainable product standard agreement determines trade patterns.
The econometric specification is based on a gravity model of international trade, which explicitly accounts for differences in the sustainability of production and preferences for sustainable production. The econometric approach addresses the potential systematic selection of countries to start international trade considering the role of product standards as accounted for in e.g., Chen, Wilson & Otsuki (2008) and Czubala et al. (2009) . By using the structural gravity model of Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) in a difference-indifference design we are able to determine the causal direct effect as well as third-country effects of an introduction of the ITTA. This paper extends the relevant literature in two ways. First, we combine the literature on the sectoral influence of production standards (e.g., Shepherd & Wilson 2013 ) and the literature on the impact of product quality on sectoral trade (e.g., Hallak 2010 , Fajgelbaum et al. 2011 . Second, we conduct a comprehensive comparative static analysis. Based on the estimated parameters of the gravity model we solve the structural gravity model with and without the ITTA. We thereby explicitly allow for changes in the multilateral resistance terms. This enables us to estimate the trade impact of an increase in sustainable product quality induced by the ITTA for participating as well as for third-countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study, which examines the thirdcountry trade effect of a unilaterally implemented sustainability standard on a global level.
Our results show that product quality matters and that it plays a central role in forming international trade patterns of tropical timber. Concerning the indicators for the sustainable product quality component we find for both, the consumers' environmental preference as well as the producers' capability to supply sustainable product quality, a theory consistent positive and significant influence on the probability as well as the volume of tropical timber trade. The counterfactual analysis shows that exporters as well as importers can considerably increase their volume of tropical timber trade by either increasing their sustainable tropical timber production or by committing themselves to demand more sustainably produced tropical timber. Because of a change in multilateral resistances third countries are also affected by an introduction of the ITTA. The results for these countries reveal a negative trade effect. Finally, the trade impact of the ITTA is not homogenous for every country in our sample. Especially small countries, which accede to the ITTA, can benefit from a change to sustainably produced tropical timber.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the agreement of our interest, the International Tropical Timber Agreement, and give a brief overview of the relevant literature. In section 3, we describe our theoretical and empirical approach to analyze the trade effects of the ITTA. In section 4, we present our data, and in section 5, we discuss the estimation results and counterfactual analyses. The last section concludes.
2 Background and previous literature
The International Tropical Timber Agreement
In 1986, following a growing public debate on the substantial degradation and destruction of the world's forests, an international environmental agreement on the management of and trade in tropical timber -the so called International Tropical Timber Agreemententered into force. Under the agreement the International Tropical Timber Organization, with its decision-making and recommendatory body, the International Tropical Timber Council, was established. The ITTA's objective is the protection of natural tropical forests from destruction, degradation and excision. In addition, the agreement aims at promoting trade in high quality, sustainably managed tropical timber. Until now the original agreement was renegotiated twice, in 1994 as well as in 2006.
Originally the ITTA was designed as a commodity-based agreement to strengthen the members' tropical timber markets.
3 This focus shifted with the 1994 ITTA which includes the "ITTO Objective 2000" and the Bali Partnership Fund. These two measures have substantially increased the importance of the sustainable use of the forest resource. For instance, forest certification schemes, developing criteria and indicators for sustainable management were implemented. Community forestry schemes were introduced and harvesting data of tropical timber were made more transparent. The Bali Partnership Fund as part of the 1994 ITTA allocates financial assistance for the implementation of sustainable tropical timber management.
As part of the agreement's objectives member countries have emphasized the desirability of producing and consuming sustainably managed tropical timber and acknowledged the accompanying price increase, namely by ". . . promoting improved understanding of the structural conditions . . . which reflect the costs of sustainable forest management" (Objective (e), ITTA 1994); ". . . promoting increased and further processing of tropical timber from sustainable sources in producer member countries, with a view to promoting their industrialization and thereby increasing their employment opportunities and export earnings" (Objective (i), ITTA 1994).
The member countries' performance in fulfilling the agreement's objectives is reviewed annually based on information submitted by the countries themselves, experts and international organizations. Following Article 44 of the 1994 ITTA by decision of the International Tropical Timber Council countries defecting significantly from these objectives can be excluded from the agreement. However, due to the voluntary characteristics of the agreement and to the best of our knowledge no country has been officially excluded by the council. The 1994 ITTA was signed by 65 member countries whereof the producing member countries possess about 80 percent of the world's tropical forests.
The impact of standards on international trade
The adoption of standards can have various economic effects on international trade. Standards often provide access to a larger international market, which allows an increase in production. The adoption of standards regularly increases the knowledge of the technology of production, which improves the quality and reliability of products and creates opportunities for economies of scale. Furthermore, increased product information and better comparability can reduce business transaction costs. Analyzing the impact of a broad range of standards on the British industry, Swann, Temple & Shurmer (1996) find that an increased adherence to standards has a positive effect on imports and exports. Based on a gravity model of international trade, Moenius (2004) shows that mutually shared standards increase the intensive margin of trade among a country pair. Maertens & Swinnen (2009) conclude that fruit and vegetables exports from Senegal to the EU grew intensively despite increasing standards in EU markets. They argue that the increasingly regulated exporting companies decreased production costs by consolidation and increased the vertical coordination at different levels of the supply chain.
Standards can also restrict the competitiveness of industries by raising compliance costs. This is often the case, where the standard setting country aims at protecting the domestic industries against the foreign importers (Esty & Geradin 1997 , Fischer & Serra 2000 . Studies about standards dealing with food safety and pesticide use, for example, show a restricting effect on the size of countries' exports (e.g., Otsuki, Wilson & Sewadeh 2001 , Wilson, Otsuki & Majumadar 2003 . In a recent study, Maskus, Otsuki & Wilson (2013) calculate that an increase in the compliance costs with the foreign standard of 1 % raises variable costs of production by 0.06 %-0.13 %.
The size and distribution of the trade effect which result from an introduction of a standard remain an empirical question and depend on the size of the affected industry and the specificity and strictness of the standard (Disdier et al. 2015) . Chen & Matoo (2008) find a heterogeneous trade effect of standards in the EU on international trade. For EU countries and industrialized non-member countries, which initially had more stringent standards, the results suggest a trade enhancing effect. Whereas for developing countries exports to the EU are significantly reduced. Disdier, Fontagné & Mimouni (2008) examine the impact of agreements on sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards on trade in general and different subsectors at product class level. They show that these agreements significantly reduce developing countries' exports to OECD countries, but do not affect trade between OECD members. Analyzing the impact of product standards on developing countries' clothing and textile exports, Czubala et al. (2009) conclude that standards reduce exports in these products significantly. Shepherd & Wilson (2013) find that non-harmonized food and agricultural standards tend to particularly affect developing countries negatively. Further, their results suggest that the trade effect is different for different product classes. Raw and slightly processed products seem to be stronger affected. In a recent study, Disdier et al. (2015) analyze the impact of standards as part of economic integration agreements on North-South and South-South trade patterns. Their results indicate that the adoption of North-South standards decreases the intensity of South-South trade significantly.
3 Theoretical model and empirical specification
Theoretical framework
The empirical analysis of the impact of the ITTA on tropical timber trade is based on a gravity model with monopolistic competition among i = 1, .., I timber exporting countries in j = 1, .., J timber importing countries (markets) as laid out in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) , Anderson & Yotov (2010) and Hallak (2010) . Accordingly, we assume that the demand of country j for country i's tropical and non-tropical timber exports X ijk is based on CES-preferences. Trade flows with index k = 0 refer to non-tropical timber, while k = 1 stands for tropical timber. These two types of timber are treated as variants of the same good and we assume that timber is additionally differentiated by firms (and thus by the country of origin).
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Tropical and non-tropical timber producing firms use inputs w ik of the forest stock W i in country i. Depending on the quality they provide, firms exhibit different input coefficients to produce timber products that can be sold to the market. Similar to the approach of Krugman (1980) the technology of a typical firm producing timber in our model is given as
where y ik denotes the output of a typical firm. Based on Hallak (2010) , θ ik is a quality indicator of production that affects factor demand with elasticity b > 0. Firms producing quality level θ ik face an input coefficient θ b ik that differs across timber types and is higher the higher the quality of production, e.g., if firms commit themselves to sustainable production of timber. Lastly, a represents the fixed inputs of a timber producing firm.
The price of a unit of the forest stock is denoted by c i and monopolistic competition implies that firms set factory gate prices with a mark-up of
where θ b ik c i denotes the marginal costs of timber production that increase in the supplied quality with elasticity b. Following Krugman (1980) , in each country i there are n i timber harvesting firms. Free entry implies zero profits and determines the output of a firm as y ik = aθ −b ik (σ − 1). Then the endowments with timber determines the number of firms as
Inserting marginal costs for p ik in the CES-demand function, the sales of a type k timber firm located in country i and serving the market in country j can be written as
denotes the CES-price index and σ > 1 the elasticity of substitution, which is constant and uniform across countries and timber types. τ ij > 1 represents iceberg-type transportation costs. Following Hallak (2010) , higher quality induced by sustainable production standards θ ik is treated as a substitute for a price decrease so that the quality term θ γ jk −b ik enters the demand function in the denominator. The effective impact of higher product quality additionally depends on the valuation of sustainable production standards and thus the willingness to pay for higher quality by consumers in each country j. Accordingly, γ jk stands for the intensity of the country j's consumer preference for the quality of timber products of type k. The compliance with the sustainability standard of timber production as requested by the ITTA is assumed to affect the provision and the valuation of timber quality, shifting the respective demand curves to the right. Since providing high quality induces additional costs, the parameter γ jk − b can be interpreted as the excess of the consumers valuation of quality over its costs. Lastly, E jk defines the expenditures on timber products which are a fraction λ k of the importer's GDP Y j .
Aggregating over importers (including the domestic market) yields the value of total production in country i as a share in world production (E W )
Thereby, country j's share of timber expenditures of type k in world expenditures E W is denoted by λ k δ j . The price effects induced by the ITTA are captured by the outward multilateral resistance term Π 1−σ i . Following Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) market clearing, and thus the constraint that the value of exports (including domestic trade) adds up to the value of production, implicitly determines equilibrium prices c i and, hence, outward multilateral resistances:
Inserting the outward multilateral resistances Π σ−1 i in the price index yields the system of multilateral resistances
and in compact form demand for tropical and non-tropical timber can be written as
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The crucial determinants of interest are the trading partners' ITTA status as well as their economic and resource endowments, which influence the demand and supply of the overall timber quality. Actually, the ITTA includes two treatments: countries sign the ITTA as producers or as consumers of tropical timber. However, these two effects can be enhanced, if the corresponding trading partner has also acceded to the ITTA. The ITTA status of exporting and importing countries is coded in dummies D i and D j that take the value 1, if the country is an ITTA member as an exporter or as an importer, respectively.
We establish a difference-in-difference design by interacting the ITTA status dummies with a dummy T k that is coded as 1, if a trade flow refers to tropical timber and 0 otherwise. As the ITTA excludes non-tropical timber, the dummy T k takes the role of time in the difference-in-difference design.
4 In this design, country pairs are observed twice, namely with a tropical and a non-tropical timber trade flow. This leads to the identifying assumption that in the absence of the ITTA tropical and non-tropical timber exhibits a constant difference. At T k = 0, trade flows are not affected by the ITTA. This means, we observe the delivery of the baseline quality that is solely determined by the overall exporting countries' resource quality q i and the importing countries' preference for quality y j , respectively. As Hallak (2010) shows, the interaction of these two terms, i.e., q i y j , can be used to test the Linder hypothesis (Linder 1961) , which suggests that countries similar in q i and y j trade more likely and more intensively with each other. At T k = 1, the control group of non-ITTA members, D i = 0 and/or D j = 0, trade baseline qualities for tropical timber as well, while ITTA-members either commit themselves to higher and sustainable quality as producer or consumer. In this way, we are able to identify the impact of the ITTA on timber trade. In order to determine the impact of the ITTA on the volume of bilateral timber trade flows, we differentiate between two effects. First, by signing the ITTA (D j = 1) an importing country reveals its higher preference for sustainable product quality of tropical timber as compared to non-tropical timber that is not covered by the ITTA. We refer to this effect as the environmental preference effect of the ITTA and use the parametrization (δ + φT k )D j . Second, if the exporting country signs the ITTA (D i = 1), it commits itself to produce a higher quality by increasing its sustainability in tropical timber production. This defines the product standard effect with parametrization (κ + ϕT k ) D i . Preferences for the baseline quality at the importer and exporter side, respectively, are modeled as βy j and αq i . The constant difference in consumption expenditures between tropical and non-tropical timber is denoted by λ k .
To sum up, the difference-in-difference design uses the following specification
Overall, we observe eight different combinations of product quality effects, which influence the trade in timber. Four of them are observed for trade in non-tropical timber, which is not covered by the ITTA provisions, and four for tropical timber trade, for which the ITTA provisions are relevant.
To infer the impact of the ITTA we first calculate the difference between tropical and non tropical timber trade flows for all four combinations of ITTA-memberships. In turn, these differences may be compared with the proper control group that involves non-ITTA exporters, non-ITTA importers or both of them. Formally, the ITTA effects are identified by the interactions of T k with D i y j , D j q i and D i D j , and are determined by the difference-in-difference parameters αφ (environmental preference effect), βϕ (product standard effect) and (κφ+δϕ+φϕ) (enhancing interaction effect), respectively. We expect all of them to be positive. To summarize we consider the following counterfactuals:
In this difference-in-difference framework, the ITTA effects can be consistently estimated under a set of identifying assumptions (Lechner 2010) . First, we have to assume that trade in tropical and non-tropical timber exhibits a constant difference, which is equivalent to the common trend assumption. For identification the stable unit treatment assumption requires that the control group, i.e., non-ITTA countries, remains unaffected by the ITTA. In our setting this assumption is likely to be violated, since the establishment of the ITTA affects prices of timber. Therefore, the ITTA will have an impact on the multilateral resistances and thus on the trade flows of all countries, also those with no ITTA membership. The structural gravity model allows to control for these third country or indirect effects on timber trade by accounting for changes in multilateral resistances in the counterfactual scenario. Thereby, we take the value of production (κ i ) and consumption (λ k δ j ) in each country as given and solve for conditional equilibrium effects (Larch & Yotov 2016) .
Lastly, it has to be emphasized that we measure the net effects of the ITTA on the value of bilateral tropical timber trade flows. If cost effects of the ITTA turn out to be quantitatively large and dominating, we should observe negative effects on tropical timber trade of ITTA-members given the assumption of a price elasticity above 1 (σ > 1). The increased costs induced by the ITTA would divert consumption to non-tropical timber and increase imports of tropical timber from non-ITTA members. However, if we do observe a positive impact, we conclude that quality effects dominate (see Hallak & Schott (2011) ).
For the econometric estimation we have to consider that many trade flows are missing. Countries may systematically select into the group of tropical timber exporters and will serve a foreign market, if it is profitable. To account for this we end up with two equations upon which the econometric specification is based. The first equation refers to the nominal volume of timber exports of country i to country j of type k, X ijk (see equation (1)). Note, this equation also covers the case of i = j (domestic trade).
Equation (2) indicates that the volume of bilateral timber trade increases in the production of quality θ ik , in the excess of the consumer's valuation of quality over its costs (γ jk − b), in the importers's share of timber expenditures of type k in world expenditures λ k δ j E w , in the value of the exporter's total production κ i . Further, trade flows are positively affected by multilateral resistances P j and Π i , which reflect the average prices on the demand and supply side. 5 Finally, timber trade decreases the higher the transportation costs τ ijk .
Due to fixed bilateral trading costs, trade flows can only be observed, if an indicator variable V ijk = 1, i.e., if an exporter i serves the import market j with timber type k. This is modeled by the subsequent equation of selection into exporting timber (see equation 3). Following the literature (Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein 2008) , we assume free entry of suppliers into the import markets at fixed costs, f ijk , which drives profits in each import market down to zero in the long run equilibrium. Based on this zero profit condition,
and under the assumption that exporter profits are separable across destination countries and timber type, one may define a latent variable (V * ijk ) that captures the propensity of trading timber
This specification implies that timber exports of type k from i to j are more likely to be observed the lower the trade barriers τ ijk , the lower the fixed trade costs f ijk , the higher the demand for and supply of quality (as captured by (γ jk − b) and θ ik , respectively), the larger the average demand and supply prices P j and Π i , the larger the import markets λ k δ j E w and the larger the exporters' production κ i . Concluding, participation in the ITTA and, hence, the production of and the preference for sustainable product quality, do not only influence the magnitude of the trade flows (intensive margin), but also the decision of an exporter to serve a foreign market with timber at all (extensive margin).
Empirical specification and comparative static analysis
The gravity model implies that the probability of exporting timber to a specific market depends on the size of that market and market specific fixed costs. As a result, unobserved trade shocks at the intensive margin also affect the propensity to export to that market, i.e. the extensive margin. Naturally, this implies that the disturbances of the outcome equation (intensive margin), as specified in equation 2 and the selection equation (extensive margin), see equation 3, are correlated, which induces biased parameter estimates in the outcome equation. This suggests applying a sample selection model as proposed in procedure 4.1.1 of Semykina & Wooldridge (2010) and discussed in Wooldridge (2002, p.835) . Similar to the cross-section sample selection model by Heckman (1976) they propose applying a two-step approach in a panel setting and additionally including exporter and importer specific averages of all explanatory variables (Mundlak terms). The Mundlak terms capture importer and exporter specific fixed effects and therefore eliminate cross-sectional importer and exporter variation. Lastly, the mills ratio (denoted as λ ijk ) corrects for sample selection in the outcome equation. Following Semykina & Wooldridge (2010) , it is based on separate Probit equations for tropical and non-tropical timber.
Potential endogeneity of the ITTA treatments is not a serious problem in our bilateral gravity model setting. First, most of the empirical work on the impact of international agreements, like the ITTA, on trade using instrumental variables involves cross-country variation ("between" estimation), not within-country variation across time ("within" estimation). We exploit "within" variation using Mundlak terms, which are equivalent to importer and exporter fixed effects. These Mundlak terms capture time invariant determinants of whether a country is, on average, more or less likely to accede to the ITTA. More importantly, an importing and exporting country's decision to accede to the ITTA is an unilateral one. This means that a country's ITTA membership does not refer to a specific bilateral relationship, but pictures a unilateral decision. Endogeneity is related to disturbances varying at the bilateral level but there is no reason to assume that the country's unilateral decision is influenced by specific bilateral relationships. See Baier & Bergstrand (2007) and Glick & Taylor (2010) for a detailed discussion on this issue. Therefore, in our bilateral setting a country's ITTA status can be seen as an exogenous decision as unobserved unilateral influences are captured by the inclusion of Mundlak terms.
To specify the econometric model, we subsume the set of explanatory variables of the outcome equation into the vector w ijk with the corresponding parameter vector β. The right hand side variables of the selection equation, z ijk , include w ijk plus additional explanatory variables. Cameron & Trivedi (2005) show that the sample selection model, since it is non-linear, is formally identified without an exclusion restriction and precise estimation is possible, if the variation of z ijk is large enough. However, adding an exclusion restriction is recommended, especially if the mills ratio turns out to be highly collinear to the explanatory variables in the outcome equation. We use indicators of unobserved destination-specific fixed costs as additional explanatory variables in the selection equation.
Denoting the iid disturbances for each country-pair by (ε ijk ,η ijk ), the empirical specification of the panel sample selection model can be written as:
Although this model seems restrictive due to its distributional assumptions, it has the important advantage of allowing the derivation of theory consistent comparative statics. In our robustness exercise, we also use a semi-parametric estimation framework, which does not rely on a normality assumption. This approach is provided by Newey (2009) and Semykina & Wooldridge (2010) .
Comparative static analysis
In order to quantify the size and distribution of the impact of the ITTA on timber trade, we compare the predicted export flows in the baseline scenario with the counterfactual that assumes that the ITTA is not in force. Thereby, we concentrate on the intensive margin assuming that the decision to serve a foreign market with tropical timber at all remains largely unaffected by the ITTA. Actually, the direct effect of the ITTA on the extensive margin is small. Setting the ITTA dummies to zero yields a reduction in the probability of exporting from 12.11 % to 11.52 %. This reduction by 0.59 percentage points exhibits a standard deviation of 1.6 percentage points. Hence, there is negligible evidence that the ITTA induces new trade relationships between countries by unlocking new markets to signatories.
To obtain an estimate of the causal impact of ITTA on the intensive margin of trade, we solve the structural gravity model with and without ITTA in force at given exporter status. For this we use the estimated parameters of the gravity model and explicitly allow for changes in the multilateral resistance terms. In this way, it is possible to estimate third-country effects, i.e., the change in timber trade of countries that do not participate in ITTA. To sum up, the comparative static analysis of the ITTA proceeds in the following steps:
1. Estimate the Heckman-sample selection model to obtain all parameter estimates. 4 The data
Data description and modification
Information on bilateral nominal timber imports are taken from the United Nation's commodity trade statistic database. We distinguish between two broad classes of timber imports, namely imports of tropical and non-tropical timber. According to the ITTA, tropical timber is defined as non-coniferous tropical timber for industrial uses, which is produced in the countries situated between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. This definition involves logs, veneer sheets, sawnwood and plywood (ITTA 1994) . We refer to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 2007 which classifies logs, veneer sheets, sawnwood and plywood into 12 tropical subcategories and 7 non-tropical complements (for a detailed definition, see table A1 in the Appendix).
To examine the trade effects of the ITTA we focus on a time period of 5 years, starting in 15 2007 until 2011. Based on the fact that for some trading partners only a few observations per product class and year are available and that a country's ITTA membership in our sample is in general time invariant, we average our sample over time and only distinguish between tropical and non-tropical timber (instead of using the 6-digit classification).
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The chosen period of observation is motivated by the fact that the 1994-agreement was superseded by a successor agreement, which entered into force on December 7th, 2011. We restrict the time period over which we average to the 5 most recent years prior to the enforcement of ITTA's third revision in order to provide conservative estimates with respect to the extensive margin. Averages over a longer time frame would increase the number of positive trade flows. For the exclusion restriction, as described in section 3.2, we use data on timber imports in the year 2000 to create a dummy variable indicating whether trading partners were already trading (non-)tropical timber in 2000.
8 Further, following Helpman et al. (2008) we use an index for common religion as a proxy for cultural differences, which potentially influence the probability that two countries start to trade. Information on the percentage of a country's population that practice a given religion is taken from the World Religion Data, National Religion Dataset (Maoz & Henderson 2013) . Analogous to Johnson (2012) , we use this information to construct a continuous variable, which represents the degree of common religion across country pairs. The higher it is, the larger is the share of residents in two countries that practice the same religion. The ability to produce and to offer a higher baseline quality of timber may primarily be a matter of exogenous (natural) conditions. We capture the baseline quality of timber via the producer countries' average annual precipitation assuming that humid areas have a higher level of quality in timber production than arid regions (Sankaran et al. 2005 , Staver, Archibald & Levin 2011 , Wagner, Rossi, Stahl, Bonal & Hérault 2012 . Analogous to Hallak (2010) we use GDP/capita as indicator for the consumer's demand for quality. Data on the trading partners' average annual precipitation in depth (mm) and on their GDP/capita stem from the World Development Indicators compiled by the World Bank.
Geographical information (distance between the trading partners, common language, contiguity, colonial linkages) is taken from the CEPII data base. Regional trade agreements (RTA) in force are taken from Baier, Bergstrand, Egger & McLaughlin (2008) and from the World Trade Organization's Regional Trade Agreements Information System. 7 Since the ITTA is quite general in its overall objectives and suggested measures, we expect that the agreement affects the various tropical timber products similarly, so that the aggregation of the tropical timber classes is justified. The heterogeneity in characteristics between tropical vs. non-tropical timber could result in systematic differences in the respective import flows which we account for by including a tropical timber dummy in the econometric specification. 8 We include the countries' trading status in the year 2002 (rather than 2000) to check whether the estimates are sensitive with respect to the starting period considered. We find that the selection as well as the outcome equation are insensitive to this alternative definition of the initial trading status. Results are available from the authors upon request.
To control for a potential confounder of the ITTA, we include a US Lacey Act dummy, which is 1 for all trade flows where the United States is an importer.
Our main independent variable of interest, the status of a country's ITTA membership, is defined through Annex A and Annex B of the 1994 International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA 1994) . Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes and briefly describes the variables.
As the set of countries that trade timber may systematically differ from the countries that do not trade timber at all, we start with a sample of all exporting and importing countries that reported at least one bilateral timber import flow. We drop exporters that are not tropical countries as they -by definition -cannot produce tropical timber (but rather represent intermediary trade partners). We are left with a sample of 123 importing and 80 exporting countries which are involved in trading timber in at least one of the subcategories listed in Table A1 in the Appendix. This results in 19,564 observations whereof about 13 % (i.e., 2,604 observations) include information on timber trade, i.e., imports in timber > 0. Out of the 2,604 bilateral trade flows, 2,007 (i.e., 77 %) of them refer to trade in tropical timber. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The average value of timber imported amounts to 2,589,877 US$ per year. If we distinguish between imports in tropical vs. non-tropical timber we find that the average value of tropical timber imported is substantially higher than the value of non-tropical timber imports (3, 301, 234 US$ vs. 198, 429 US$) . In about 41 % of all observations at least one of the trading partners has signed the ITTA and in 17 % of the observations exporter as well as importer are ITTA members. Tables 2 and 3 provide further descriptives based only on tropical timber trade. Table 2 lists the ten largest importers and exporters with respect to the aggregated (over the country's trading partners) value of imported tropical timber. All of these countries have signed the ITTA. Table 3 presents the trade flows in tropical timber in percent of the total import value for each continent pair. About 40 % of the total tropical timber trade occurs within Asia. Trade flows from Africa to Europe rank second but are considerably lower, namely 15 %, which is followed by trade flows from Asia to Europe and from Asia to the United States. The remaining exporter-importer combinations are of minor relevance with respect to the import value. Overall, Asia accounts for 55 %, Europe for 27 % and North America for 12 % of the total import value of tropical timber. The largest exporters are Asia, Africa and South America whose shares amount to 61 %, 29 % and 8 %, respectively. Table 4 compares the volume as well as the number of tropical timber trade flows across countries that signed or did not sign the ITTA. The left hand side panel shows that the group in which both trading partners signed the ITTA accounts for 85 % of the total import volume. Second rank the group of countries in which the exporter but not the importer is an ITTA member: The respective share in trade volume is considerably lower at 10 %. Comparing these percentages with the groups' shares in the total number of non-zero trade flows given in the right hand side panel of Table 4 reveals that the number of trade flows are more balanced across the four groups. This comparison further indicates that the average trade flow among ITTA partners is considerably higher than the average trade flow between countries where only one or none of the trading partners signed the ITTA. The right hand side panel of Table 4 also shows that we should have sufficient variation to identify the trade effect of the ITTA empirically. Note, that in our design the type of timber (tropical vs. non-tropical) plays the role of the time dimension in a standard difference-in-difference framework, while the group of non-ITTA members form the control group. Furthermore, countries can be ITTA members as producers and as consumers and we interact with exporters' production quality indicators and importers' valuation of quality, which allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects. For estimating the environmental preference effect (i.e. D j = 1) the control group consists of all the trade flows that refer to non-ITTA importers (43.45 %). The treatment group comprises trade flows of ITTA importers (56.55 %). Analogously, for identifying the product standard effect (D i = 1) the control group refers to trade flows of non-ITTA exporters (31.99 %) and the treatment group captures exports of ITTA members (68.01 %).
Descriptive statistics
Clearly, these huge differences in trade patterns across countries pictured in tables 2 to 4 may result from various factors that are unrelated to the countries' ITTA status. The question remains whether these considerable variations across the groups still emerge when exogenous factors are controlled for. The following section aims at analyzing the trade flows in more detail and focuses on the impact of the ITTA on the supply of and demand for tropical timber.
The estimation results
The estimation results are based on the structural gravity model developed in section 3.1. Column (1) of table 5 shows the selection equation and column (2) shows the outcome equation as defined in section 3.2.
The significant mills ratio, its interaction with tropical timber trade flows as well as the significant determinants in the selection equation point at the systematic selection of countries into the group of traders. The partners' initial (year 2000) trading status, which is used as an exclusion restriction, significantly influences the probability of timber trade. Whereas the second exclusion restriction variable, common religion between the country pairs, does not show a significant effect on the extensive margin. Further, the distance variables as proxies for trading costs influence the probability of trading tropical timber as well as the trade volume as expected. The closer the countries are with respect to their location, their language and colonial links the more likely they trade with each other and the higher their volume of trade. The existence of a regional trade agreement between the trading partners significantly increases the probability of trading, but does not show an effect on the volume of trade. The US Lacey Act significantly affects the intensive margin of trade, but has no effect on the extensive margin.
The indicators for the baseline product quality component in table 5 reveal that product quality matters and significantly impacts the extensive as well as the intensive margin of timber trade. The probability of trading increases with a rise in baseline timber quality (captured via the Linder term) and with increasing consumers' preference for product quality. We do not find a significant trade impact of a country's capability to supply timber with high baseline quality. With regard to the level of trade our results suggest that the consumers' higher preference for product quality significantly increases the volume of trade, whereas the other two baseline quality indicators do not reveal a significant impact. The probability for positive trade flows as well as the volume is higher for trading partners who both signed the ITTA which, similar to the Linder term, adds an additional bilateral baseline ITTA effect to the unilateral ones. Concerning our parameters of interest -the indicators for the sustainable product quality component -we find for both, the consumers' environmental preference as well as the producers' capability to supply sustainable product quality, a theory consistent positive influence on the probability as well as the level of tropical timber trade. The coefficient on the interaction of the exporter's ITTA membership with the importer's demand for a baseline timber quality (approximated via its GDP/capita) implies that once the exporter commits himself to a higher level of quality (i.e., a higher sustainability component of the overall product quality) in the timber production by signing the ITTA, the probability as well as the magnitude of tropical timber trade increase in GDP/capita of the importer. This means that the export of sustainably produced tropical timber particularly pays off in richer importing countries with a higher demand for high-quality tropical timber than in poorer importing countries. The second interaction -the importer's ITTA status with the exporter's supply of a baseline tropical timber quality -reveals that exporters with a higher baseline timber quality are more likely to trade tropical timber and export significantly more to ITTA importers than exporting countries with lower timber quality. In other words, given that exporters endowed with a high baseline timber quality have a comparative advantage in providing sustainably produced and managed tropical timber, which the ITTA importers demand, we find that their trade flows tend to be higher than the trade flows of low quality timber exporters (for an analogous interpretation see Hallak (2010) ). However, we do not find a theory consistent bilateral effect on tropical timber trade in addition to the identified unilateral effects when the exporter and the importer country joined the ITTA. The finding that the standards imposed by the ITTA increase its members' trade performance is in line with Maertens & Swinnen (2009) who also present evidence for increasing African fruit and vegetable exports to the EU despite increasing standards in the EU markets.
To check the sensitivity of the baseline results we conduct several robustness analyses. First, instead of using country specific annual precipitation (see argumentation in section 4) we include country specific forest rents as an indicator for quality in timber production. 9 We thereby assume that producing higher quality is mirrored in higher forest rents. Panel A in table A3 in the appendix reports the result of this robustness exercise focussing on the coefficients for sustainable product quality (T k = 1). All in all, the robustness estimates support the findings of our base regression as they indicate that the major conclusions still hold. In particular, we still find evidence for a significant positive environmental preference effect once we replace the exporters' annual precipitation by the forest rent. The sustainable product quality effect significantly increases the probability of trading tropical timber, but is not precisely estimated regarding the volume of timber trade. The second robustness check refers to 1,044 trade flows where 522 country pairs trade both, tropical AND non-tropical timber, to examine whether our main findings remain robust once we only use the identical control group for each of the tropical timber traders (which is the same country pair trading non-tropical timber). Panel B of table A3 shows that even if we take the bilateral unobserved variables into account, we again find that ITTA consumers have higher preferences for sustainable timber. Also, the sustainable product quality effect tends to positively influence tropical timber flows, but its impact is not significant.
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Third, we relax the assumption of normally distributed disturbances and apply a semi-parametric estimation of the outcome equation. We re-estimate the outcome equation model using the two-step semi-parametric series estimators introduced by Newey (2009) and replace the Mills ratio by splines with evenly spaced knots. Panel C of table A3 highlights that the major results are also robust with respect to the normality assumption of the disturbances as we find similar estimates for the environmental preference and sustainable product quality effects regarding sign and magnitude as in the base specification. The econometric estimates indicate that the sustainable product quality component significantly determines tropical timber trade flows between member countries. In order to determine the size of this trade effect, we create a counterfactual that represents a world in which neither the exporter nor the importer is an ITTA member. The first state pictures the product standard effect and the second the environmental preference effect. Referring to the estimates reported in table 5, we predict the import volume in tropical timber for the country's observed ITTA status and compare these values with the respective counterfactual figures. These predictions are based on the procedure introduced in section 3.2.1. Specifically, the difference in the trade volumes between the observed situation and the counterfactual is measured as percentage change relative to the counterfactual status (i.e., non existence of ITTA memberships on the exporter or importer side) and is split into a direct trade effect and a total trade effect. The direct trade effect holds the relative mill prices and therefore the multilateral resistance terms constant. It can be interpreted as an upper bound of the ITTA effect. In contrast, the total effect allows for changes in exporter and importer specific multilateral resistances (indirect effects) as introduced in Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) in addition to the direct effects. As a consequence non-ITTA members are indirectly affected by an introduction of the ITTA. Table 6 and table 7 show the direct and total mean changes in trade volume due to the countries' ITTA membership. The product standard effect is identified, if the exporter joins the ITTA but the importer does not (IT T A i = 1, IT T A j = 0) and trade flow refers to tropical timber (T k = 1). On the other hand, if the importer accedes to the ITTA but the exporter does not, the estimated model reveals the environmental preference effect (IT T A i = 0, IT T A j = 1) at (T k = 1).
Starting with the product standard effect as pictured in table 6 we find that exporters signing the ITTA experience a substantial increase in tropical timber trade. Considering the direct effect, exporters who change to sustainably produced tropical timber can double their export volume. However, the induced changes in multilateral resistance terms dampen this increase, so that the total trade effects level off at a trade increase of around 6 %. The results for non-ITTA exporters reveal that even if no direct trade effect occurs (they are non-ITTA signatories in the actual and counterfactual world), indirect price effects induce negative trade effects, in particular when shipping tropical timber to ITTA importers. This negative product standard effect indicates that non-ITTA producer countries lose market shares, especially if importer countries are ITTA signatories. Table 7 shows the effect, when an importing country states a higher demand for sustainably produced tropical timber, which leads to a considerable increase in tropical timber trade. The direct trade effect for ITTA importers indicates an increase in tropical timber imports of around 71 %. When we take the indirect price effects into account, the total increase in trade for ITTA importers amounts to approximately 4 %. Trade volumes of importers, who did not sign the ITTA, are reduced by about 7 %. This negative environmental preference effect implies that non-ITTA importers tend to reduce their demand for tropical timber and switch to cheaper sources. 
The distribution of the sustainable quality effect
An advantage of our empirical approach is that we are able to calculate the trade impact of an ITTA induced change to sustainably produced tropical timber for every country in our sample separately. This allows for an alternative and more detailed way of examining the ITTA's impact on the trade patterns of tropical timber. Figure 1 pictures the variation of the product standard effect per country. It focuses on the total trade effects and distinguishes between the ITTA status and the size of the exporter. We define small exporters as countries, whose forest rent (measured in USD) lies below the 75 percentile in the sample. The left hand side panel of the graph nicely highlights that, in particular, small exporters benefit from a change to sustainably produced tropical timber as they experience a substantial increase in tropical timber exports ranging from 21.25 % to 139.28 %. For the large exporters the effect of a change to sustainably produced tropical timber is smaller and ranges from -23.27 % to 63.43 %.
The right hand side panel shows that even the non-ITTA countries are affected by the ITTA induced changes in multilateral prices: Particularly small non-ITTA exporters are confronted with reduced tropical timber flows.
For the environmental preference effect we find similar patterns as for the product standard effect. ITTA status and size. Small importers are defined as countries for which their GDP (in constant USD) lies below the 75 percentile. Again, small ITTA importers are the ones that benefit most from a commitment to sustainably produced tropical timber (see left hand side panel). Their tropical timber imports rise by 0.98 % to 99.43 % which is more pronounced than the change in tropical timber trade of the large importers ranging from -33.09 % to 81.41 %. For non-ITTA importers we again find that particularly small importing countries experience a decrease in tropical timber imports due to the ITTA.
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Conclusion
This paper addresses the impact of sustainability in production on international trade. In particular, it examines the effect of the International Tropical Timber Agreement on countries' trade patterns of tropical timber. We find that a sustainably product quality matters and plays a central role in forming international trade patterns of tropical timber. The consumers' environmental preference as well as the producers' capability to supply sustainable product quality show a theory consistent positive and significant influence on the probability as well as the level of 11 To get an alternative overview of the trade effect of an ITTA induced change in sustainable product quality we plot the results of the counterfactual analysis for each country on a world map. In Figure A1 we show the total changes in the volume of exports (aggregating over importer countries) if a group of exporting countries switch to sustainably produced tropical timber. Figure A2 shows the total change in trade volume for all import markets (aggregated over exporter countries). Exporters as well as importers can considerably increase their volume of tropical timber trade by either increasing their sustainable tropical timber production or by committing themselves to consume more sustainably produced tropical timber. Even taking price effects into account ITTA exporting countries are able to increase their exports by about 6 %. As for ITTA importers, their trade volume in tropical timber increases by around 4 %. Because the introduction of the ITTA changes the relative timber prices, third countries are also affected. The results for non-ITTA exporters reveal that they experience a reduction in trade by about 6 % to 7 % The trade impact of an ITTA induced change to sustainably produced tropical timber is not homogenously distributed in our sample. We analyse these country specific ITTA impacts for each country in our sample, which includes ITTA as well as non-ITTA countries. Our results show that especially small countries can benefit from a change to sustainably produced tropical timber. Given our model set up, the increase in nominal trade volumes implies that the ITTA can be also seen as an effective environmental policy, which leads to a lower harvest rate in tropical timber. This follows from the consequence that higher production costs induced by the ITTA results in higher prices for the signatory countries as compared to the control group of non-ITTA signatories. Given a price elastic demand for tropical timber, higher prices lead to a lower consumption level. Therefore, the higher nominal trade volumes indicate that a lower amount of tropical timber is traded at higher prices. This leads us to conclude that consumers have a higher willingness to pay for sustainably produced tropical timber (Hallak & Schott 2011) .
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It has to be noted that this study implicitly assumes that the level of compliance with the ITTA obligations is homogenously distributed among the member countries, since the level of compliance remains unobserved. More detailed information on the implementation of sustainable production methods induced by the ITTA would allow to control for heterogeneity in compliance resulting, e.g., from differences in the regulatory and institutional capacities or strategic decisions of countries. This issue would be an insightful future research question.
Although the ITTA is based on voluntary behavior, the insights of this analysis are highly relevant in the light of the amendment of the U.S. Lacey Act in 2008 and the recently introduced EU Timber Regulation, which entered into force in March 2013.
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The EU Timber Regulation prohibits the placing of illegally harvested timber and timber products on the EU market. Countries importing or operating in the EU must exercise a high degree of due diligence and transparency in their production processes. Our results provide first evidence that such programs may indeed be successful in supporting trade flows in high quality and sustainably produced tropical timber products.
We are convinced that the proposed model and the empirical strategy for estimating the trade effects of the ITTA contribute to a better understanding of how environmental policies can affect the production processes and their valuation by the consumers. Finally, even if the subject of our analysis, i.e., tropical timber, is very specified, our approach can be more broadly used to determine the quality impact of international agreements, e.g., product standard agreements, on international trade. 
